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efore 2009, every American presidential 
administration had been uniform in its policy of 
consistently enforcing the nation’s drug laws.  
Pursuant to federal law, possession, use, or cultivation of any drug 
deemed illegal by Congress was, universally, a prosecutable offense.  
Notwithstanding this unwavering policy, throughout the 1990s and 
early 2000s, the marijuana industry continued to grow, and several 
states legalized medicinal marijuana despite the standing federal 
prohibition.  Moreover, President Barrack Obama, shortly after 
taking office, broke precedent with his predecessors when he put 
forth a policy of non-enforcement through a publicly released 
memorandum authored by the then Deputy Attorney General, David 
Ogden, (hereinafter Ogden Memo or Memo) “provid[ing] 
clarification and guidance to federal prosecutors in states that have 
enacted laws authorizing the medical use of marijuana.”1  In this 
Memo, Ogden discouraged expenditure of “limited investigative and 
prosecutorial resources” on “individuals whose actions are in clear 
and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for 
the medical use of marijuana.”2  Following the release of this Memo, 
many more states have enacted legislation that would legalize 
medical marijuana, and accordingly, during the Obama 
administration, the medical marijuana industry has demonstrated 
incredible growth.  Furthermore, it is projected to continue to grow 
exponentially over the next five years. 
Based on this considerable increase in medical-marijuana-
related activity following the release of the Ogden Memo, it is 
reasonable to conclude that much of the medical marijuana 
industry’s growth can be attributed to a reliance on this Memo.  In 
this article, I will argue why such broad reliance lays a dangerous 
path—for the states which have already legalized medical marijuana, 
for the states that are in the process of legalizing medical marijuana, 
for the 1.3 million people currently working in the industry, and for 
                                                 
1 Memorandum For Selected United States Attorneys from Deputy Attorney 
General David Ogden to United States Attorneys (Oct. 19, 2009) [hereinafter 















all who will soon join it.  To make my case, I first explain why the 
Ogden Memo has no real ability to constrain individual Assistant 
United States Attorneys’ (AUSAs’) charging decisions, given the 
difficulty of imposing internal checks on their prosecutorial 
discretion, especially in this context.  Next, I argue that the Ogden 
Memo also lacks legal authority that can be relied upon by medical 
marijuana defendants whose activities were in compliance with their 
state medical marijuana laws, as has already been demonstrated by 
the District of Southern California’s decision in U.S. v. Stacy3  
Further, the Memo does not restrain other federal governmental 
authorities from imposing non-criminal sanctions upon individuals, 
even when their behavior complies with their own state’s medical 
marijuana laws.  Additionally, even if the Ogden Memo has indeed 
succeeded in constraining federal prosecutorial activity in this arena 
to some degree, there is no reason to believe that the Memo will 
continue to do so after the completion of Obama’s second term.  
In the final section of this article, I turn to the very notion of 
the Executive Branch’s releasing of a policy of non-enforcement of a 
federal law upon an entire category of crime, such as that described 
in the Ogden Memo.  I argue that it is a questionable use of 
prosecutorial discretion, pursuant to the Executive Branch’s law-
enforcement obligation described in the United States Constitution.4  
I explain my concern that, if left unchecked, the Ogden Memo will 
set a precedent which allows the Executive Branch to effectively 
veto any standing United States criminal law by simply deciding not 
to enforce it.  Ultimately, I fear that this extreme use of prosecutorial 
discretion—specifically, the shirking of a Constitutional obligation 
on the part of the Executive Branch and, therefore, the threatening of 
Congress’s ability to create valid federal criminal law5—could have 
grave consequences for the validity of the federal government’s 
                                                 
3 734 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1079–80 (S.D. Cal. 2010). 
4 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The Executive Branch] shall take care that the laws 
[are] faithfully executed.”). 
5 Legal positivists, such as John Austin, believe that laws require a sovereign to 
impose sanctions for violations of law in order for that law to be legitimate. See 
generally J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832).  See 
also Robert S. Summers, On Identifying And Reconstructing A General Legal 
Theory  Some Thoughts Prompted By Professor Moore's Critique, 69 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1014, 1035 (1984) (stating Austin’s conception of law focused on “duty-
















A. Origins of the War on Drugs 
 
President Richard Nixon officially declared a “War on 
Drugs” in 1971.6  Some would even argue that this federally-waged 
“war” had begun even before that time.7  In 1965, Congress passed 
the Drug Abuse Control Amendments Act, which created the Bureau 
of Drug Abuse Control within the Food and Drug Administration.8  
Then, in 1968, Lyndon Johnson established the Bureau of Narcotics 
and Dangerous Drugs, later referred to as the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA), which absorbed the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control 
in 1973, and which was under the umbrella of the Department of 
Justice (DOJ).9 
Beginning in 1969, the Drug War crossed the border into 
foreign policy when efforts to limit drug smuggling from Mexico 
culminated in “Operation Intercept,” which effectively resulted in a 
shutdown of the Mexico-United States border.10  On the domestic 
front, President Richard Nixon had previously signed the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act into law, 
which established a new categorization system for drug regulation 
and thereby became the new basis for federal drug policy.11  Most 
notably for the purposes of this article, Title II of this Act, 
commonly referred to as the “Controlled Substances Act” (CSA), 
                                                 
6 Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 435–439 (2010). 
7 See id. 
8 See Richard C. Boldt, Drug Policy in Context: Rhetoric and Practice in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, 62 S.C. L. REV. 261, 286 (2010). 
9 See id. 
10 See Matthew S. Jenner, Note, International Drug Trafficking: A Global Problem 
with a Domestic Solution, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 901, 912 (2011).  The 
operation only lasted two weeks because of the massive complications it caused, 
but thereafter Mexico agreed to more aggressively attack marijuana trade.  Id. 
11 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. 












divides all drugs into five “schedules,” based on whether the 
particular drug has a currently accepted medical use, and it imposes 
restrictions accordingly.12  The statute reflects a determination that 
marijuana has no medical benefits, thereby placing it in “schedule I,” 
where it remains today.13  Nixon also created the National 
Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, whose sole purpose was 
to study marijuana use and abuse in the United States.14  Therefore, 
it did not come as a huge surprise when the President declared drug 
use to be “Public Enemy Number One” in June of 1971.15 
 Early on in the government’s response, the DEA established 
itself as the agency in the driver’s seat of the intensifying Drug War 
with respect to the investigation of, and efforts to control, the 
domestic drug trade.16  As the years passed, however, public support 
for the Drug War, as well as the intensity from Washington, began to 
dwindle.17  Accordingly, the aggressive anti-drug rhetoric of 
previous administrations diminished significantly during the 
presidencies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter.18  However, with the 
election of Ronald Regan, and, subsequently, that of George H.W. 
Bush, the Drug War again gained momentum in the 1980s, as 
Congress passed three key statutes, each designed with the intention 
of bolstering the breadth and enforcement of the nation’s drug 
laws.19 
                                                 
12 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971; United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 
532 U.S. 483, 491–492 (2001). 
13 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971). 
14 See EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL: TOWARD A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK 14 (King 
County Bar Ass’n, 2005) [hereinafter EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL], available at 
http://www.kcba.org/druglaw/pdf/effectivedrugcontrol.pdf. 
15 See Boldt, supra note 8, at 286; NPR.ORG, Special Series: The Forgotten War 
on Drugs, [hereinafter Forgotten War], 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9252490 (last visited Sept. 
29, 2014). 
16 Yung, supra note 6, at 437–40. Note that the DEA is also heavily involved in 
enforcement on an international level. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, DEA International Training, 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/ops/Training/IntTraining.shtml (last visited Sept. 29, 
2014).  
17 See EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 14, at 26; Yung, supra note 6, at 
437–40. 
18 Boldt, supra note 8, at 287. 












 In 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act, which added a series of new drugs to the list of previously 
prohibited substances, and the Act also introduced new laws 
allowing prosecutors to seize assets of alleged drug offenders (prior 
to conviction).20  Subsequently, in 1986, Congress passed the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act, which addressed widespread concern about crack 
cocaine, by introducing mandatory minimum sentences, along with 
other harsher penalties.21  Lastly, in 1988, Congress passed the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act, which further increased mandatory drug penalties22 
and created the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the head of 
which has the unofficial title of “Drug Czar.”23 
 Rhetorically, the 1980s also saw a concerted government 
effort to inform the public about the dangers of drug use.  
Specifically, the Regan Administration introduced the “Just Say No” 
slogan, which became a national rallying cry for anti-drug 
proponents.24  In 1987, the Partnership for a Drug Free America25 
released a well-known advertisement analogizing a cracked egg to a 
brain under the influence of drugs, which was subsequently named 
one of the top 100 best commercials of all time by TV Guide.26  
Additionally, other public and private entities joined the fight during 
this era, including the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (“DARE”) 
program, originally a Los Angeles-focused organization that later 
became national.27  
 
 
                                                 
20 See H.R.J. Res. 648, 98th Cong. (1984); Boldt, supra note 8, at 287–288. 
21 See H.R. 5484, 99th Cong. (1986); Boldt, supra note 8, at 287–288. 
22 See H.R. 5210, 100th Cong. (1988); Boldt, supra note 8, at 287–288. 
23 Boldt, supra note 8, at 287-288; See EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 14, 
at 27. 
24 Yung, supra note 7, at 437–40. 
25 The Partnership at Drugfree.org, formerly known as the Partnership for a Drug-
Free America is a New York City-based non-profit organization which runs 
campaigns against teenage drug and alcohol abuse in the United States. See THE 
PARTNERSHIP AT DRUGFREE.ORG, http://www.drugfree.org  (last visited Sept. 29, 
2014). 
26 See Erika Alexander, Famous fried eggs: Students debate effectiveness, 
accuracy of well-known anti-drug commercial, CNN STUDENT BUREAU (Dec. 6, 
2000), http://edition.cnn.com/fyi/interactive/news/brain/brain.on.drugs.html (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2014). 












B. Modern Legislative and Judicial Approaches to the Marijuana 
“Problem”  
 
Throughout the entire federally-waged Drug War, spanning 
from the 1960s through today, federal law has not distinguished 
between medicinal and recreational uses of marijuana, as it has 
consistently deemed both to be expressly forbidden.28  In fact, 
lawmakers have repeatedly refused to change marijuana’s status 
under the Controlled Substances Act, a step that would allow the 
substance to legally be used for medicinal purposes.29  Perhaps even 
more significantly, Congress has repeatedly rejected amendments to 
appropriation bills that would prohibit the DOJ from using funds to 
prevent states from implementing laws that authorize the possession, 
cultivation, and use of marijuana for medical purposes.30  
Additionally, two significant Supreme Court decisions, Gonzalez v. 
Raich, and U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop, have indicated 
that legislative regulation of marijuana is solely within the power of 
the federal government, and that federal courts may not carve out 
exceptions to the CSA for individuals who claim a dire medical need 
for marijuana.31 
In the 2001 case Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop, the Court 
considered a California statute that created an exception to 
California laws prohibiting the possession and cultivation of 
                                                 
28 See Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice's New 
Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 635 (2011). 
29 See H.R. 5842, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 2087, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2233, 
108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2592, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1344, 107th Cong. 
(2001); H.R. 912, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1782, 105th Cong. (1997); Vijay 
Sekhon, Comment, Highly Uncertain Times: An Analysis of the Executive 
Branch's Decision To Not Investigate or Prosecute Individuals in Compliance with 
State Medical Marijuana Laws, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 553, 557 n.18 (2010); 
see also Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and 
the States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 
1434–35 (2009) (discussing failed legislative and administrative proposals to 
reschedule marijuana at the federal level). 
30 See H. Amdt. 674, 110th Cong. (2007); H. Amdt. 1144, 109th Cong. (2006); H. 
Amdt. 272, 109th Cong. (2005); H. Amdt. 646, 109th Cong. (2004); H. Amdt. 
297, 108th Cong. (2003); Sekhon, supra note 29, at 557–58 n.19. 
31 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005); Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 












marijuana.32  Specifically, the statute held that “[t]hese prohibitions 
[of cultivation and possession of marijuana] no longer apply to a 
patient or his primary caregiver who possesses or cultivates 
marijuana for the patient's medical purposes upon the 
recommendation or approval of a physician.”33  The petitioner, 
Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop, argued that the defense of 
“medical necessity” should be read into the language of the CSA that 
prohibits the cultivation or possession of marijuana.34  The Court 
disagreed, holding that it “need not decide…whether necessity can 
ever be a defense when the federal statute does not expressly provide 
for it.  To resolve the question presented in this case, [it] need only 
recognize that a medical necessity exception for marijuana is at odds 
with the terms of the Controlled Substances Act.”35  The Court 
further explained that the CSA “does not explicitly abrogate the 
defense[,] [b]ut its provisions leave no doubt that the defense is 
unavailable.”36  
 A few years later, the Supreme Court explicitly held that the 
regulation of marijuana under the CSA fell squarely within 
Congress’ constitutionally-mandated Commerce Power37 and ruled 
that marijuana regulation was undoubtedly within the domain of 
federal law,38 thereby rendering it binding on the states pursuant to 
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.39  In Raich, despite the 
fact that the respondent was indisputably growing and ingesting 
marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law,40 DEA 
agents seized and destroyed all of his cannabis plants.41  In its 
                                                 
32 Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. at 486. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 490. 
35 Id. at 491. 
36 Id. 
37 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have power . . . [to] 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States . . . ."). 
38 Raich, 545 U.S. at 5. 
39 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges 
in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any 
state to the contrary notwithstanding.”). 
40 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2005). 












decision, the Court declared that its jurisprudence “establishes 
Congress's power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an 
economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.”42  Analogizing the marijuana market to that of 
wheat43 because both have a “substantial effect on supply and 
demand in the national market for that commodity,”44 the Court also 
stressed that it need not determine “whether respondents' activities, 
taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in 
fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”45  
Citing the enforcement difficulties that would inevitably be involved 
in distinguishing between locally and non-locally grown marijuana, 
as well as concerns about diversion of locally grown marijuana, the 
Court had “no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational 
basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture 
and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the 
CSA.”46  
Despite the fact that all evidence indicates that federal 
lawmakers have been, and continue to be, adamantly opposed to the 
legalization of marijuana;47 that the Supreme Court has held that no 
                                                 
42 See id. at 17. 
43 The Court relied upon an earlier decision, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942), where, in rejecting the appellee farmer's contention that Congress's 
admitted power to regulate the production of wheat for commerce did not 
authorize federal regulation of wheat production intended wholly for the appellee's 
own consumption, the Court established that Congress can regulate purely 
intrastate activity that is not itself "commercial."  That is, not produced for sale if 
it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the 
regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 5 (citing 
317 U.S. 111, 127–128 (1942)). 
44 Of course, this analogy is striking because the marijuana market as a whole is 
illegal under federal law. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971.  Based on this significant 
difference between the situation in Wickard and the situation in Raich, it seems 
that the Supreme Court could have easily distinguished the two cases.  See 
generally Raich, 545 U.S. at 57–59 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
45 See id. at 19, 22. 
46 See id. at 22.  In assessing the scope of Congress ' authority under the 
Commerce Clause, the court need not determine whether the regulated activities, 
taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce; it only must 
determine whether a "rational basis" exists for so concluding. Id. (citing United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995). 
47 See H.R. 5842, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 2087, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2233, 












medical exception can be read into the CSA;48 and that the Supreme 
Court has granted Congress the sole authority to regulate marijuana 
(medical or non-medical),49 a significant (and still growing) number 
of states have recently reformed their own laws to legalize medical 
marijuana, beginning with California in 1996.50  While the specifics 
of these individual state laws vary, they generally permit a resident 
to possess, consume, and grow marijuana by obtaining a qualifying 
diagnosis and recommendation from a licensed physician.51 
 
C. Pre-Obama Executive Branch Response to State Legalization of 
Medical Marijuana 
 
Even prior to the aforementioned Supreme Court decisions, 
federal officials vowed to come down hard on the state medical 
marijuana legalization movement.52  Specifically, in response to 
California’s 1996 Compassionate Use Act,53 President Clinton’s 
“Drug Czar,” Barry McCaffrey, issued a public statement, which 
outlined the steps that the federal government would take to prevent 
states from legalizing medical marijuana.54  McCaffrey stated that 
suppliers would be prosecuted; various government benefits would 
be denied to anyone who used marijuana pursuant to state law; and 
marijuana-recommending physicians’ licenses would be revoked.55 
                                                                                                                
(2001); H.R. 912, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1782, 105th Cong. (1997); see also H. 
Amdt. 674, 110th Cong. (2007); H. Amdt. 1144, 109th Cong. (2006); H. Amdt. 
272, 109th Cong. (2005); H. Amdt. 646, 109th Cong. (2004); H.Amdt. 297, 108th 
Cong. (2003). 
48 See Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. at 491. 
49 See Raich 545 U.S. at 19, 22. 
50 Mikos, supra note 28, at 636. 
51 Id. 
52 See id.at 637. 
53 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Deering 2014). 
54 See Administrative Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California 
Proposition 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997) (“Department of Justice's 
(DOJ) position is that a practitioner's action of recommending or prescribing 
Schedule I controlled substances is not consistent with the "public interest" (as that 
phrase is used in the federal Controlled Substances Act) and will lead to 
administrative action by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to revoke 
the practitioner's registration.”). 












Regarding such revocations, Vanderbilt University School of 
Law Professor Robert Mikos observed in his article, titled On the 
Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States' Overlooked 
Power to Legalize Federal Crime, that the states “seem[ed to] 
anticipate this roadblock.”56  For example, California’s medical 
marijuana laws only required a physician’s recommendation for 
attainment of the cannabis, as opposed to a prescription.57  While 
this specific distinction did not originally affect the DEA’s 
crackdown efforts, it was eventually found to be constitutionally 
significant by the Ninth Circuit in Conant v. Walters.58  According 
to this Court, a recommendation, unlike a prescription, entails no 
more than simply discussing marijuana use; it does not necessarily 
encourage marijuana use.59  As a result of this statutory distinction, 
in conjunction with the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the DEA no longer 
threatens to sanction physicians for recommending marijuana.60 
The battle against state medical marijuana legalization 
intensified under the administration of George W. Bush, as Assistant 
United States Attorneys prosecuted several high-profile medical 
marijuana suppliers during these eight years.61  Even more at the 
front lines of this administration’s crackdown was the DEA, which 
conducted significant numbers of raids on medical marijuana 
dispensaries in this period.62  Through the laws enacted in the 1980s 
pertaining to asset seizure,63 the DEA also frequently commenced 
forfeiture proceedings against landlords who are aware of the fact 
that their tenants are growing marijuana on their property.64  
                                                 
56 Mikos, supra note 30, at 1466. 
57 Id.  
58 See 309 F.3d 629, 639–40 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“By 
speaking candidly to their patients about the potential benefits of medical 
marijuana, [physicians] risk losing their license to write prescriptions, which 
would prevent them from functioning as doctors.”). 
59 See id. at 638. 
60 See Mikos, supra note 29, at 1466–67. 
61 Mikos, supra note 28, at 638 (citing Bob Egelko, Pot Advocate Gets 1 Day in 
Jail and Gives Judge a Piece of His Mind, S.F. CHRON., July 7, 2007, at B3 
(detailing Bush II Administration's prosecution of Ed Rosenthal, the so-called guru 
of ganga)). 
62 See Mikos, supra note 28, at 638 (noting that there were almost two hundred 
raids on medical marijuana dispensaries in CA alone during this period). 
63 See H.R.J. Res. 648, 98th Cong. (1984). 












Ultimately, however, these federal efforts to take down large 
marijuana suppliers are unlikely to have had a significant impact on 
the supply or use of marijuana as a whole, as evidence indicates that 
production of medical marijuana has still surged in the past few 
decades.65  Professor Robert Mikos attributes this “fail[ure]” (at least 
from the perspective of the federal government) to the lack of 
“substantial barriers to entry in the marijuana market.”66  
Specifically, he explains that marijuana can be produced in any 
climate; special skills are unnecessary to cultivate the plant; and 
ample information regarding proper cultivation is readily available 
online.67  Due to this relative ease of production, as well as the 
significant demand for the product, the sub-optimal results of any 
federally initiated and sponsored crackdown on marijuana seem to 
demonstrate that the federal government alone (without the help of 
the states) simply lacks the resources to make a dent in this ever-
growing industry, notwithstanding the field’s [at best] questionable 
legality.68 
 
D. The Obama Administration Tries a Different Approach 
 
In 2009, the Obama administration declared that it would 
take a political 180-degree turn from the medical marijuana policies 
of its predecessors, when it announced that it would cease 
enforcement of the federal ban on medical marijuana.69  This 
announcement came by way of multiple individuals through multiple 
vehicles, starting with the [arguably ambiguous]70 promises made 
                                                 
65 See id. (citing JOHN GETTMAN, MARIJUANA PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
3 (2006), available 
at http://www.drugscience.org/Archive/bcr2/MJCropReport2006.pdf (estimating 
that domestic marijuana production surged ten-fold between 1981 and 2006, in 
spite of ongoing federal and state eradication campaigns; also concluding that 
marijuana is the largest cash crop in the United States)). 
66 Mikos, supra note 29, at 1467. 
67 Id. 
68 See discussion of Ogden Memo’s authoritative force infra Part III. 
69 Mikos, supra note 29, at 633. 
70 Stacy, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 1080 (“At best, these statements show that in early 
2009, when former President Bush personnel still held key positions in the federal 
government, the Obama administration did not anticipate that it would continue 












earlier by then candidate Barack Obama and concurrent statements 
from his spokesmen made before the election.71  Subsequently, 
almost one year after the 2008 election, came the most significant 
promulgation of the new President’s policy in a highly-publicized 
memorandum to “Selected United States Attorneys” from Deputy 
Attorney General David Ogden.72  The purported purpose of the 
Ogden Memo was to “provide[] uniform guidance to focus federal 
investigations and prosecutions in [] States [in which medical 
marijuana is legal] on core federal enforcement priorities.”73  Citing 
a commitment to “making efficient and rational use of [the DOJ’s] 
limited investigatory and prosecutorial resources,” the Ogden Memo 
urged federal prosecutors not to enforce the federal marijuana ban 
against persons who act in “clear and unambiguous compliance” 
with state medical marijuana laws.74 
At first glance, as Professor Mikos observes, the Ogden 
Memo “seemingly represents a ground-breaking shift in federal drug 
policy…[because] it appears to suspend the federal government’s 
long-standing campaign against medical marijuana.”75  This is the 
interpretation that was embraced by the media,76 as well as a 
significant number of states and many of their residents.77 Shortly 
before the Ogden Memo was released, as of early October 2009, 12 
states allowed for some form of legalized medical marijuana.78  
                                                 
71 See id. at 1078. 
72 See Ogden Memo, supra note 1. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Mikos, supra note 28, at 639. 
76 See id. at 639 n.34 (citing Editorial, Medical Marijuana's Merit: Obama 
Administration's Policy Change Is Right Call, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 26, 
2009, at A12 ("[The NEP memorandum] reverses longstanding federal policy and 
marks a step toward separating those who could be helped by marijuana's 
therapeutic properties from those who criminally distribute or use it."); Editorial, 
Good Sense on Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2009, at A30 ("Attorney 
General Eric Holder Jr. has made the right decision, calling off prosecutions of 
patients who use marijuana for medical purposes or those who distribute it to them 
- provided they comply with state law. It is a welcome reversal of the Bush 
administration's ideologically driven campaign to prosecute dispensaries.")). 
77 See discussion of state legalization and growth of industry infra Part II(D). 
78 See PROCON.ORG, Historical Timeline: History of Marijuana as Medicine - 












Following the release of the Ogden Memo, Maine immediately 
legalized medical marijuana within a matter of weeks, and then 
seven more states followed with legalizations by March of 2014.79  
Additionally, and perhaps more indicative of a trend, today, less than 
five years after the Ogden Memo was released, several other states, 
not including the aforementioned 20, currently80 have pending 
legislation which will allow for the legalization of medical 
marijuana.81 
The impact of the Ogden Memo also can be measured by the 
significant economic growth of the industry during this period and to 
date.  According to IBISWorld, an industry reporting company, the 
federal government’s “signal [of] its tacit acceptance” of state action 
to legalize marijuana for medical use has caused the nationwide 
medical marijuana industry to grow at a rate of 13.8 percent since 
2009.82  IBISWorld projects the industry’s annual revenue to be $2 
billion and estimates that over 1.3 million people across the country 
are employed in the industry.83  Of course, with the pending 
legalization legislation in several additional states, one can certainly 
expect those industry numbers to continue to grow.84  Indeed, a 
recent Huffington Post article cited a projected annual growth of the 
“legal” marijuana market, the vast majority of which is medical, to 
eclipse that of even the smartphone—formerly the fastest growing 
market, based on a recent report about the growth of the marijuana 
industry.85 
                                                                                                                
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.timeline.php?timelineID=000026#2005-
2009 (last visited Aug. 29, 2014) [hereinafter PROCON.ORG]. 
79 See id.  These states include: New Jersey, Arizona, Delaware, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Illinois. 
80 As of September, 2014. 
81 See PROCON.ORG, supra note 78. 
82 See Brian Alexander, Medical Marijuana Requests Climb Sky High, Apr. 15, 
2009, http://rss.msnbc.msn.com/id/30217044 [hereinafter Alexander]; see also 
IBISWORLD.COM, Medical Marijuana Growing in the US: Market Research 
Report, http://www.ibisworld.com/industry/medical-marijuana-growing.html (last 
visited August 29, 2014) (medical marijuana industry currently growing at a rate 
of 16.2%) [hereinafter IBISWORLD.COM]. 
83 IBISWORLD.COM, supra note 82. 
84 See generally Alexander, supra note 82. 
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Steve Berg, managing director of Wells Fargo Bank and 
editor of this report, the second edition of the State of Legal 
Marijuana Markets, stated that cannabis is the fastest-growing 
domestic industry in the nation.86  Berg’s report credits a “seismic 
shift in the public attitudes towards marijuana” for its rapid growth 
in a large group of select states.87  The report predicts that, in the 
next five years, fourteen more states will legalize marijuana in some 
form, and that the market will grow to $10.2 billion annually by 
2018.88 
 
E. Resistance to the Nationwide Trend of Medical Marijuana 
Legalization within the Executive Branch’s Own Department of 
Justice 
 
Unfortunately for some, a “shift” in “public attitudes towards 
[medical] marijuana”89 does not necessarily equate to federal 
acceptance of this state-catalyzed trend across the three branches.  In 
fact, there is evidence of some form of resistance to this trend from 
every branch of government: the Legislative Branch has consistently 
rejected attempts at CSA reform;90 the Supreme Court has 
analogized the legal wheat market with the illegal marijuana market 
to support its holding that marijuana regulation is within the federal 
domain;91 and, perhaps most surprisingly, even the Executive 
                                                                                                                
(stating the smartphone market is growing at an annual rate of 7.3%) [hereinafter 
Schwartz] (citing Arcview Market Research, LEGAL MARIJUANA MARKETS 2D 
(2013), available at http://www.arcviewmarketresearch.com) [hereinafter Arcview 
Market Research]. 
86 See Arcview Market Research, supra note 85. 
87 Schwartz, supra note 85.  
88 Id. (citing Arcview Market Research, supra note 85). 
89 See Schwartz, supra note 85.  
90 See H.R. 5842, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 2087, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2233, 
108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2592, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1344, 107th Cong. 
(2001); H.R. 912, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1782, 105th Cong. (1997); see also H. 
Amdt. 674, 110th Cong. (2007); H. Amdt. 1144, 109th Cong. (2006); H. Amdt. 
272, 109th Cong. (2005); H. Amdt. 646, 109th Cong. (2004); H. Amdt. 297, 108th 
Cong. (2003).  
91 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 19, 22. This analogy has become a subject of much 
debate. See generally Steven K. Balman, Supreme Court Review: Constitutional 
Irony: Gonzales V. Raich, Federalism And Congressional Regulation Of Intrastate 












Branch’s own Drug Enforcement Agency continues to battle medical 
marijuana legalization, in violation of its own department’s, i.e., the 
DOJ’s, internal policy pursuant to the Ogden Memo.92 
As publicized evidence of its open resistance to the 
legalization of medical marijuana and non-enforcement of medical-
marijuana crimes, four years after the release of the Ogden Memo, 
the DEA released a 68-page report (hereinafter DEA Position 
Report), detailing its stance against the legalization of medical 
marijuana and the reasons for this position.93  In summary, the report 
states that “[t]he campaign to legitimize what is called ‘medical’ 
marijuana is based on two propositions: first, that science views 
marijuana as medicine; and second, that the DEA targets sick and 
dying people using the drug.  Neither proposition is true.”94  Early in 
this report, the DEA reiterates what David Ogden had stated in his 
2009 memorandum, but offers a far more conservative 
interpretation: “While some people have interpreted [the Ogden 
Memo’s dissemination of Executive Branch marijuana enforcement 
policy] to mean that the federal government has relaxed its policy on 
“medical” marijuana,” the DEA Position Report explains that “this 
in fact is not the case.  Investigations and prosecutions of violations 
of state and federal law will continue.  These are the guidelines DEA 
has and will continue to follow.”95 
The report then cites a far less-well-publicized letter to 
former administrators of the DEA,96 written by Attorney General 
Eric Holder on October 13, 2010 in response to the administrators’ 
earlier letter outlining their concerns about California’s Proposition 
19,97 a ballot initiative for the legalization of marijuana.98  The DEA 
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93 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE DEA POSITION ON MARIJUANA, Apr. 2013, 
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Position Report informs readers that, in this letter, the Attorney 
General stated: 
 
[R]egardless of the passage of [Proposition 
19] or similar legislation, the Department of 
Justice will remain firmly committed to 
enforcing the CSA in all states.  Prosecution 
of those who manufacture, distribute, or 
possess any illegal drugs, including marijuana, 
and the disruption of drug trafficking 
organizations is a core priority of the 
Department.  Accordingly, we will vigorously 
enforce the CSA against those individuals and 
organizations that possess, manufacture, or 
distribute marijuana for recreational use, even 
if such activities are permitted under state 
law.99 
 
In support of its position on medical marijuana, the DEA 
Report cites over 100 sources, many of which are purported medical 
                                                                                                                
98 See DEA POSITION REPORT, supra note 93, at 1 (citing a letter to the former 
Administrators of the Drug Enforcement Administration, in response to their 
concerns about Proposition 13 and the legalization of marijuana) (stating that the 
DEA maintains that, in this letter, Holder was merely “reiterate[ing]” the DOJ’s 
position on the legalization of medical marijuana); see also John Hoeffel, Holder 
Vows Fight Over Prop. 19, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2010, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/16/local/la-me-marijuana-holder-20101016.  
In the original letter sent by “Former Administrators of the DEA” to Eric Holder, 
the Former Administrators expressed their “shock[] and dismay[]” caused by 
Holder’s “decision to allow the states of Colorado and Washington to legalize the 
production and sale of marijuana for recreational use.”  See Letter from the Former 
Administrators of  the  Drug  Enforcement  Administration to the Attorney General 
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maintains that, in this letter, Holder was merely “reiterate[ing]” the DOJ’s position 












and scientific experts.100  For example, the American Medical 
Association has rejected proponents’ attempts to convince them to 
endorse marijuana as medicine, and instead has urged that marijuana 
remain as a prohibited, controlled substance; the American Cancer 
Society does not advocate inhaling smoke, nor the legalization of 
marijuana; the American Academy of Pediatrics believes that “[a]ny 
change in the legal status of marijuana, even if limited to adults, 
could affect the prevalence of use among adolescents”; the National 
Multiple Sclerosis Society states that studies done to date have not 
provided convincing evidence that marijuana benefits people with 
MS, and thus maintains that marijuana is not a recommended 
treatment; and the British Medical Association voiced extreme 
concern that downgrading the criminal status of marijuana would 
“mislead” the public into believing that the drug is safe, maintaining 
that marijuana “has been linked to greater risk of heart disease, lung 
cancer, bronchitis and emphysema,” to name a few.101  Additionally, 
the DEA report cites a wide array of evidence to support its position 
on marijuana use in general, including contentions that: marijuana 
use is a gateway to harder drug use;102 marijuana growers have a 
negative impact on the environment;103 today’s marijuana is far 
more “potent” than that of previous decades;104 its use among teens 
is disproportionately associated with high school dropouts;105 
marijuana is detrimental to mental health;106 it is detrimental to 
physical health;107 and its use is also dangerous to non-users because 
                                                 
100 See generally id. at 1–2. 
101 See DEA POSITION REPORT, supra note 94, at 2–6; DEA, Speaking Out Against 
Drug Legalization 38 (2010).  
102 Id. at 37. 
103 Id. at 24 (citing evidence that chemicals used by marijuana growers end up in 
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104 Id. at 25–26 (citing analysis from the National Institute on Drug Abuse). 
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thoughts than non-users”). 
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of its proclivity for causing “delinquent behaviors” and “drugged 
drivers.”108 
Additionally, all evidence of the DEA enforcement action 
pertaining to marijuana possessors, cultivators, and users, is 
consistent with its official stance proclaimed in the DEA Position 
Report, with no evidence of curtailment following the release of the 
Ogden Memo.  After California voters approved of the 
Compassionate Use Act, Proposition 215, which removed state-level 
criminal penalties for possession and use of marijuana by patients 
with a doctor’s recommendation,109 the DEA immediately followed 
with tempestuous raids of grow houses (properties, usually located 
in suburban neighborhoods, where marijuana is produced) and 
dispensaries.110  These frequent raids have continued through the 
1990s and 2000s,111 and did not show any signs of slowing down 
after Obama became President.  
For example, a mere week after the Ogden Memo release, 
DEA agents raided a medical marijuana dispensary in San Francisco, 
claiming that the establishment was in violation of state and federal 
law.112  Today, newspaper and online periodicals regularly report on 
the numerous DEA raids conducted on medical marijuana 
                                                 
108 Id. at 39–41. 
109 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(d) (West Supp. 1998) ("Section 
11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, relating to the 
cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient's primary 
caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes 
of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a 
physician."). 
110 See Ruth C. Stern & J. Herbie DiFonzo, The End of the Red Queen's Race: 
Medical Marijuana in the New Century, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 673, 674–75 
(2009) [hereinafter Stern & Difonzo]. 
111 See, e.g., Scott Glover, Morro Bay Pot Dispensary Owner Found Guilty of 
Federal Charges, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, available at 
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-pot6-2008aug06,0,516054.story; Steve 
Hymon, DEA Raids 10 Pot Shops, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 2007, at B4.; Eugene W. 
Fields, Rifle-toting DEA Agents Raid Marijuana Store, ORANGE CNTY. REG., Jul. 
30, 2008, available at http://www.ocregister.com/articles/adams-orange-agents-
2109067-city-going. 
112 Stern & DiFonzo, supra note 110, at 765 n.15 (citing Rachel Gordon, DEA 
Raids Pot Dispensary in SF, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 26, 2009, available at http:// 
http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/DEA-raids-pot-dispensary-in-SF-












businesses, even when those facilities are in compliance with state 
law.113  Further, contrary to the Agency’s assertion in its 2013 
Position Report that it does not target “the sick and the dying,”114 
there is at least some evidence of DEA agents raiding farms that 
supplied marijuana to hospices.115  For instance, in 2002, “between 
twenty and thirty armed agents led by officers of the federal Drug 
Enforcement Administration” raided a farm that supplied medical 
marijuana to a hospice in California.116  The hospice had 250 
patients, many of whom were terminally ill.117  As the Federal Court 
for the Northern District of California described: 
 
The DEA agents forcibly entered the 
premises, pointed loaded firearms at 
[Respondents], forced them to the ground, and 
handcuffed them . . . . [Respondents] were 
then…transported to the federal courthouse in 
San Jose, where they were released without 
being charged . . . . DEA agents remained on 
the premises for eight hours, seizing 167 
marijuana plants, many of the [hospice] 
members' weekly allotments of medicinal 
marijuana, various documents and records, 
and other items.118 
 
 
                                                 
113 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 112; Joseph Serna & Emily Alpert Reyes, DEA, 
LAPD raid marijuana dispensaries, Beverly Hills homes, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 
2014, available at http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-marijuana-
dispensaries-raid-20140311,0,7956322.story#axzz2xNqEghry; Matthew Fleischer, 
DEA Continues Crackdown on Medical Marijuana Dispensaries, TAKEPART, Aug. 
4, 2014, http://www.takepart.com/article/2013/07/29/marijuana-legalization-dea-
still-targeting-dispensaries.  
114 See DEA Position Report, supra note 98, at 1 (“DEA targets criminals engaged 
in the cultivation and trafficking of marijuana, not the sick and dying.”). 
115 See Stern & DiFonzo, supra note 110, at 725–26. 
116 See Cnty. of Santa Cruz v. Ashcroft, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 
2003). 
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A. The Problem 
 
Twenty-one jurisdictions have passed, or are in the process of 
passing, laws legalizing medical marijuana since the release of the 
Ogden Memo in October 2009.119  Moreover, the medical marijuana 
industry, as measured by dollars and people employed, has grown 
significantly since the release of the Memo, and it continues to grow 
[perhaps even increasingly] rapidly.120  There is no escaping the 
obvious conclusion that this increase in medical-marijuana-related 
activity is directly attributable to the fact that the Executive Branch 
has promulgated a policy of non-prosecution of federal medical 
marijuana crimes, assuming compliance with state laws, so that 
medical marijuana patients and dispensaries are now comfortable 
with possessing, cultivating and using marijuana, without fear of 
federal criminal sanctions.121 
Given this context, it would be reasonable to presume that 
much of the marijuana industry’s recent growth can be attributed to 
state and individual reliance on the Ogden Memo,122 in spite of 
numerous examples of federal government resistance to the 
Memo.123  And given that an entire multi-billion dollar industry is 
being made possible by way of individual state legalizations of a 
federally illegal substance, pursuant primarily to one single policy 
memo,124 the obvious and important question becomes whether this 
Ogden Memo carriers any legal or authoritative weight.  In this 
article, I will argue that the Ogden Memo utterly lacks the requisite 
authoritative force to merit an entire industry’s reliance thereupon;125 
                                                 
119 See Jolie Lee, Which States Have Legalized Marijuana?, USA TODAY 
NETWORK, Jan. 6, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-
now/2014/01/06/marijuana-legal-states-medical-recreational/4343199; 
PROCON.ORG, supra note 79 (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
120 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 82.  
121 See Sekhon, supra note 29, at 560. 
122 See id. (“The imprimatur of the Executive Branch with respect to medical 
marijuana provides individuals with a false sense of security in relying upon 
compliance with state medical marijuana laws.”). 
123 See supra Part II. 
124 See generally Ogden Memo, supra note 1. 












and furthermore that, even if the memo did have dominion right 
now, it is still risky, and perhaps even dangerous, for state legislators 
and individuals to rely upon it due to uncertainty regarding future 
administrations’ medical marijuana policies.126  It follows, therefore, 
that states and individuals should be very apprehensive about 
embracing this new “trend” as one that is here to stay.127  Lastly, I 
will argue that this unprecedented policy of non-enforcement upon 
an entire category of crime is inherently unconstitutional because it 
constitutes an abuse of prosecutorial discretion by way of usurping 
the authority of Congress to make effective laws.128  
 
B. The Ogden Memo’s Promulgated Policy has no Real Authority 
Over the Prosecutorial Discretion of Individual Assistant United 
States Attorneys  
 
While it is certainly possible that the Ogden Memo’s 
promulgated policy regarding non-enforcement of marijuana 
possessors, cultivators, and users who are in compliance with state 
law has influenced some AUSAs in their prosecutorial decisions, it 
certainly does not technically constrain the activities of Department 
of Justice personnel.  As stated earlier, there remains considerable 
reason to believe that the DEA has not curtailed its vigorous 
enforcement of federal marijuana law following the release of the 
Ogden Memo, based on its intermittent raiding of grow houses and 
dispensaries in compliance with state law, as well as the publicly-
released DEA Position Report.129  In light of the Ogden Memo, one 
might conclude that the lack of consistency within the Department of 
Justice resulting from the seemingly contradictory policies between 
the DEA and the U.S. Attorney’s Office would ultimately produce a 
relatively positive result for those arrested by DEA agents for 
                                                 
126 See discussion infra Part III.D. 
127 See generally supra discussion Part III.A. and sources cited supra note 82. 
128 See infra discussion Part III.E.; see also U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (“[The 
Executive Branch] shall take care that the laws [are] faithfully executed.”); U.S. 
Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges 
in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any 
state to the contrary notwithstanding.”). 












violating the federal Controlled Substances Act,130 assuming that the 
defendants were acting in compliance with state medical marijuana 
law.  After all, even if one is arrested, how can one be convicted of a 
crime under a statute that prosecutors universally refuse to 
enforce?131 
Unfortunately for this class of defendants, however, there is 
ample reason to believe that the Ogden Memo imposes very little 
actual restraint on individual AUSAs, who are the individuals with 
the ultimate authority to decide what charges (if any) to bring in 
criminal cases of federal jurisdiction.132  In general, each AUSA is 
afforded an incredible amount of discretion in every charging 
decision.133 Theoretically, there is probably a strong argument that 
publicized DOJ policy should constrain the prosecutorial discretion 
of AUSAs, at least to some degree. However, defendants are 
typically unable to be granted relief when federal prosecutors fail to 
adhere to DOJ guidelines, thereby rendering general DOJ guidelines 
as de facto without legal authority.134  
For instance, the “Petite Policy” of the DOJ,135 which 
“precludes the initiation or continuation of a federal prosecution, 
                                                 
130 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2006). 
131 See Ogden Memo, supra note 1. 
132 See Mikos, supra note 28, at 643; see also discussion infra Part III.E. 
(discussing of limits of prosecutorial discretion). 
133 See Ellen S. Podgor, Department Of Justice Guidelines: Balancing 
"Discretionary Justice", 13 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 168 (2004) 
(“Prosecutors are afforded enormous discretion in a multitude of decisions.”) 
[hereinafter Podger]. 
134 See id. at 177–86 (noting that the charging decision may be limited when an 
individual’s constitutional rights are in question in the context of “vindictive” and 
“selective” prosecutions); Wayte v. U.S., 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (stating that 
selective prosecution claims are judged according to ordinary equal protection 
standards); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978) (finding due 
process was violated when the prosecution brought a claim in retaliation for the 
defendant's exercise of her legal rights); U.S. v. Brown, 862 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 
1286 (N.D. Ala. 2012).  Vindictive prosecution differs from selective prosecution 
in that the former arises out of the severity of the charges against a defendant and 
is raised after the defendant exercises a constitutional right, while selective 
prosecution occurs when a person is prosecuted based on an immutable personal 
characteristic—such as race or religion—or in response to some constitutionally-
protected act that a person has done prior to the criminal charge being brought 
against him.  Brown, 862 F. Supp. at 1285.  












following a prior state or federal prosecution based on substantially 
the same act(s) or transgression(s),”136 is sometimes violated by 
individual AUSAs in certain cases.137 In her article, Department of 
Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary Justice,” Georgia 
State University College of Law professor Ellen Podgor explains 
that, “Although the government has discretion to dismiss cases when 
its ‘Petite Policy’ is violated, defendants are not afforded this same 
opportunity.”138  As additional material illustrative of the notion that 
defendants lack recourse when AUSAs do not adhere to internal 
policy, Ms. Podgor also cites examples of prosecutors’ occasional 
failure to adhere to the requirement that they must advise grand jury 
witnesses that they are “targets” or “subjects” of an investigation 
pursuant to DOJ guidelines.  Moreover, she explains that, even in 
these situations, defendants utterly lack recourse.139 
On the other hand, there are certainly alternative methods of 
enforcement of, along with several mechanisms that are designed to 
encourage AUSAs to follow, the promulgated DOJ policy, thereby 
supporting an argument that there are perhaps some internal checks 
on the prosecutorial discretion of individual AUSAs. 140  For 
example, the President nominates U.S. Attorneys, who are the 
                                                 
136 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-2.031 (2003), 
available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/2mcrm.htm#9-
2.031 [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL]. 
137 See, e.g., U.S. v. Rodriguez, 948 F.2d 914, 915 (5th Cir. 1991); U.S. v. 
Robinson, 774 F.2d 261, 275 (8th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Ng, 699 F.2d 63, 71 (2d. Cir. 
1983). 
138 See Podgor, supra note 133, at 179 (citing Rodriguez, 948 F.2d at 915 (finding 
"[n]o error in denial of the motion, because the Petite policy is merely an internal 
rule of the Justice Department"); Robinson, 774 F.2d at 275 (stating that "[e]ven a 
genuine failure by the Government to follow the Petite policy does not create a 
right that a defendant can invoke to bar federal prosecution"); U.S. v. Ng, 699 F.2d 
at 71 (finding that the Petite policy "[i]s not a statute or regulation; nor is it 
constitutionally mandated"); U.S. v. Byars, 762 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 n.6 (E.D. Va. 
1991) (finding that the Petite policy is a DOJ internal policy); U.S. v, Bouthot, 685 
F. Supp. 286 (D. Mass. 1988) (“The Petite policy does not create any substantive 
or due process rights which a criminal defendant may invoke against the 
government.”). 
139 Podgor, supra note 133, at 181–84. 
140 I refer to these as internal checks because they come from within the Executive 
Branch.  By contrast, External Checks would come from the Legislative or 












overseers of AUSAs,141 and the President has the power to remove 
any U.S. Attorney for any reason, including disregarding DOJ 
policy.142  The U.S. Attorney General can also remove, reprimand, 
or suspend AUSAs;143 “slash the budget of nonconforming 
districts”;144 and even, in some circumstances, “move to vacate 
convictions that [he or] she believes to have been obtained in 
violation of DOJ policy.”145 
Despite these purported internal checks on the prosecutorial 
discretion of individual non-conforming AUSAs—or on non-
conforming federal districts in which the AUSAs practice—they are 
likely fairly ineffectual in the context of ensuring conformity with 
the policy put forth in the Ogden Memo, given the inherent difficulty 
of monitoring AUSA compliance therewith.146  Because AUSAs 
only technically violate the Ogden Memo’s policy when they 
prosecute defendants who have complied with the medical marijuana 
laws of their own state, a determination of whether an AUSA has 
violated the memo’s policy requires a determination of whether a 
given defendant’s marijuana-related activity was in compliance with 
his or her state’s law.147  And, as Professor Mikos explains, this 
determination “proves remarkably difficult for several reasons.”148 
 First, although state legislatures that have legalized 
marijuana, for medical purposes or otherwise, have generally 
adopted regulations detailing who may possess and use marijuana, 
these legislatures have not adequately addressed how the patients are 
                                                 
141 28 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2006); U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, supra note 136, at § 3-
4.752. 
142 See 28 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2014) (“Each United States attorney is subject to 
removal by the President.”); Parson v. U.S., 167 U.S. 324, 335 (1897); OFFICE OF 
THE INSPECTOR GEN., AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. 
ATTORNEYS IN 2006 (2008) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0809a/chapter13.htm#200 (“It is the 
President’s and the Department [of justice]’s prerogative to remove a U.S. 
Attorney who they believe is not adhering to their priorities or not adequately 
pursuing the types of prosecutions that the Department chooses to emphasize.”). 
143 U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, supra note 136, at § 3-4.752. 
144 Mikos, supra note 28, at 644. 
145 Id. 
146 See e.g., Podgor, supra note 133, at 180. 
147 See Ogden Memo, supra note 1, at 1–2. 












supposed to acquire that marijuana.149  Alaska, for example, has 
expressly banned the sale of marijuana, even to qualified patients,150 
despite the fact that its laws also explicitly allow these patients to 
possess, and even grow, the drug, themselves.151  And while Alaska 
clearly forbids its sale, most states permitting the possession of 
marijuana have not addressed the issue of how legal marijuana 
possessors are supposed to acquire the marijuana in the first place.152  
Therefore, as it may be an open question whether a given defendant 
is operating under compliance with state law,153 it follows that it is 
also an open question whether a prosecution of that defendant 
violates the policy put forth by the Ogden Memo.154 
Furthermore, even when states have laws on this topic, there 
are two reasons why these laws might be extremely difficult to 
locate for either an AUSA himself or herself and/or a DOJ 
supervisor seeking to determine whether a given AUSA has 
complied with the Ogden Memo.155  First, given the changing status 
of marijuana laws over the last two decades, even in individual 
states, the “black letter” state law might be somewhat elusive and/or 
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Jason Brandeis, The Continuing Vitality of Ravin v. State: Alaskans Still Have A 
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STAT. § 17.37.030 states, "A patient, primary caregiver, or alternate caregiver 
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criminal prosecution related to marijuana to the extent provided in AS 11.71.090."  
152 See Mikos, supra note 29, at 1431–32 (“This means that qualified patients must 
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constitute exceptions to this proposition.  See id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-
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§ 11362.765 (Deering 2014). 
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very complicated.156  Specifically, state medical marijuana laws 
might consist of voter-approved referenda, state statutes, state 
agency regulations, city or town local ordinances, and judicial 
opinions of courts of varying authority attempting to interpret the 
above.157 Moreover, even when the laws are clear, determining 
whether a given defendant has complied with a particular state law, a 
necessary determination for ascertaining whether an AUSA’s 
prosecution is in violation of the Ogden Memo, might be very 
difficult.158  For example, if a state law criminalizes the sale of 
marijuana to anyone other than a qualified patient, and if an AUSA 
is considering prosecuting the dispensary for a violation of that law, 
it might be next to impossible to determine whether a given 
purchaser constituted a qualified patient because states often do not 
require patients to register, nor do they require patients to even 
obtain a written physician’s recommendation.159 
 If the DOJ is not able to adequately and accurately gauge 
compliance with the Ogden Memo, it follows that the DOJ also 
“cannot credibly pressure [AUSAs] to adhere to the policy.”160  
Matters are further complicated by the contrasting policies on the 
subject of medical marijuana within the DOJ, specifically those 
which have been put forth by the DEA.161  Further, as a practical 
matter, for the reasons stated above, ascertaining compliance on the 
part of individual AUSAs might very well require significant 
resources from the DOJ.  Ironically, therefore, an attempt to 
discipline a particular AUSA for a lack of compliance with this 
policy might also arguably counteract the plain language of the 
Ogden Memo, if read broadly, which states: “[t]he Department is . . . 
committed to making efficient . . . use of its limited investigative and 
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prosecutorial resources.”162  A supervising AUSA’s expenditure of 
time and effort trying to ascertain the actual status of a given state’s 
complex medical marijuana law is not an efficient use of that 
professional’s time, nor is it an efficient use of tax-payer-funded 
resources. 
 Because the DOJ rarely disciplines individual AUSAs for 
violating internal regulations,163 and because determining whether an 
AUSA actually complied with the Ogden Memo is especially 
difficult in any event,164 it follows that the Ogden Memo utterly 
lacks weight with respect to curtailing federal prosecutions of 
medical marijuana facilities.  A rule that utterly lacks any 
enforcement mechanism, and that entirely lacks a record of 
enforcement, is hardly a rule at all.165  
 
C. The Ogden Memo Does Not Protect Individuals in the Criminal 
Adjudicatory Context, nor Does It Protect Individuals from Civil 
Sanctions 
 
 As discussed in previous sections of this article, there exists 
ample reason to believe that the Ogden Memo is utterly lacking in 
authoritative weight with respect to its ability to constrain 
prosecutorial discretion,166 as well as its ability to constrain the 
activities of the DEA.167  Additionally, a significant amount of 
evidence indicates that the Ogden Memo is also unable to serve as a 
defense to criminal and civil sanctions.  As Professor Mikos 
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163 Note that the Ogden Memo probably only qualifies as an internal regulation in 
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explains, the memo is merely providing “guidance regarding how the 
DOJ will enforce the law, not a declaration of what the law 
means.”168  While the latter, by its nature, holds the sort of binding 
legal weight that can reasonably be relied upon, the former does 
not.169  Accordingly, the Federal Court for the Southern District of 
California has held that “[a] reasonable belief that one will not be 
prosecuted is not the same thing as a reasonable belief that one's 
actions do not violate federal law.”170  For these reasons, in this 
section of my article, I argue that the Ogden Memo will not provide 
a defense for people charged with violations of the Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA), even if those people are in compliance with 
their state’s medical marijuana laws.  I also explain that, with the 
exception of one federal agency,171 the policy of non-prosecution in 
this arena is not respected as a defense to non-criminal sanctions for 
violations of federal marijuana laws either.172 
 While the doctrine of entrapment by estoppel is generally 
considered to be a “narrow exception to the general principle that 
ignorance of the law” is no excuse for a violation thereof,173 the 
defense is probably unavailing in the context of medical marijuana 
prosecutions.174  To assert the entrapment by estoppel defense, the 
defendant typically must prove the following: (1) a government 
official (2) made an affirmative representation that the conduct was 
legal, and (3) the defendant reasonably relied on this 
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171 The US Department of Veterans Affairs released a Veterans Health 
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representation.175  In theory, “because the government misled the 
defendant, the defense estops the government from asserting that the 
advice provided was incorrect.”176  One of the goals behind the 
policy that ignorance of the law is no excuse is to encourage 
potential defendants to ascertain exactly what the law is.177  
However, in light of modern criminal statutory complexity, the 
Supreme Court has recognized the need for the entrapment by 
estoppel defense because the rationale of disincentivizing intentional 
ignorance is not furthered where a defendant has sought out and 
acted upon a seemingly legitimate, but actually incorrect, 
government interpretation of the law.178 
 Typically, courts have held that to succeed under an 
entrapment by estoppel defense, the defendant must do more than 
show that the government made vague or even contradictory 
statements.179  Rather, a defendant must demonstrate that the 
government affirmatively informed him that the proscribed conduct 
was permissible, and that he reasonably relied on this information.180  
“A defendant's reliance is reasonable if ‘a person sincerely desirous 
of obeying the law would have accepted the information as true, and 
would not have been put on notice to make further inquiries.’”181  In 
Cox v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions of 
picketers who were arrested for picketing in a given location, after 
they proved that they had previously been given permission to picket 
in that location.182  Similarly, in United States v. Pennsylvania 
Industrial Chemical Corporation, the Supreme Court held that it was 
error to deny a corporate defendant the right to present evidence that 
                                                 
175 Madeline Stavis, Deactivating the Mousetrap: Entrapment by Estoppel as a 
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199–200 (1991).  
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it had been affirmatively misled by the responsible administrative 
agency into believing that the law did not apply in this situation.183  
 There have not, however, been any decisions in which the 
entrapment by estoppel defense has been successfully applied where 
a defendant relied on a disseminated prosecutorial policy of non-
enforcement, as opposed to an affirmative representation of the 
legality of the conduct in question.184  Accordingly, the Federal 
Court for the Southern District of California has expressly 
disallowed this defense for medical marijuana prosecutions within its 
jurisdiction, when, in the 2010 case United States v. Stacy, the 
defendant relied upon the Obama Administration’s public 
announcements regarding its policy of non-enforcement for 
violations of the CSA in a situation where his actions complied with 
state law.185  In Stacy, the defendant operated a medical marijuana 
collective under compliance with state law for three months before 
the DEA raided his dispensary and seized a significant amount of 
marijuana, pursuant to federal law.186  The DOJ brought charges 
under the CSA.187  
 At his trial, the defendant first pointed to statements made by 
President Obama when he was a presidential candidate.188  On 
national television, candidate Obama had expressed his openness to 
the notion of prescribing medical marijuana as palliative medicine, 
and he indicated that he would not use Justice Department resources 
to try to prosecute medical marijuana users or to circumvent state 
laws regarding doctors prescribing medical marijuana.189  The 
defendant also presented evidence that a spokesman for the 
candidate had stated that Obama would end the DEA raids on 
medical marijuana suppliers in states with their own laws permitting 
medical marijuana use.190  In response, the Court explained that it is 
not reasonable to believe that a presidential candidate is empowered 
to speak for the federal government regarding the application of 
                                                 
183 See generally 411 U.S. 655 (1973). 
184 See United States v. Stacy, 734 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1080 (S.D. Cal. 2010). 
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federal drug laws.191  The Court further noted that the candidate’s 
statements lacked specificity and did not make representations 
regarding changing federal law to make the use, cultivation, and 
distribution of medical marijuana legal.192 
 Also put forth by the defendant were statements by Eric 
Holder, speaking as Attorney General after Obama’s election, 
maintaining that he would not be authorizing DEA raids of medical 
marijuana dispensaries during the Obama administration; statements 
by Holder that the DOJ has no plans to prosecute dispensaries that 
are legal under state law; and the Ogden Memo,193 as well as other, 
somewhat more ambiguous, official statements.194  The Court 
responded by holding that: 
 
[N]one of these statements constitute affirmative 
representations that Defendant’s operation of a 
medical marijuana dispensary is lawful under federal 
law.  At best, these statements show that in early 
2009, when former President Bush personnel still 
held key positions in the federal government, the 
Obama administration did not anticipate that it would 
continue DEA raids of medical marijuana 
dispensaries complying with state law . . . .  No 
promise was made that the DEA would never raid 
medical marijuana dispensaries claiming to operate in 
compliance with state law or that individuals 
operating such dispensaries would not be 
prosecuted.195 
 
 The Court further held that, “even assuming the statements at 
issue could reasonably be interpreted as establishing a policy that 
operators of medical marijuana dispensaries in compliance with state 
law will not be prosecuted, there is still no affirmative statement that 
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Defendant’s conduct is lawful under federal law.”196  The Court 
emphasized the importance of broad prosecutorial discretion, 
explaining that a holding that the Government is estopped from 
bringing a case if the prosecution, itself, contradicts prosecutorial 
policy “would constitute improper judicial interference with 
prosecutorial decision-making.”197  The Court also reiterated that the 
fact that an individual may not be prosecuted under a given state law 
does not provide him or her with immunity under federal law.198 
 Moreover, while its authority within the DOJ is questionable 
at best, the Ogden Memo certainly does not bind Executive Branch 
officials operating outside the purview of the DOJ.199  In 1997—a 
time when the state medical marijuana movement was still in its 
early stages—the federal government reacted to state legalization of 
medical marijuana by calling upon various agencies200 to “respond” 
to Arizona’s and California’s legalization of this substance for 
medical usage.201  An Example of these agency responses is the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s requirement that 
public housing be denied to those who violate federal drug policy, 202 
regardless of compliance with state law.203  Similarly, the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) has since made clear that the 
Ogden Memo “will have no bearing on the . . . [DOT’s] regulated 
drug testing program,”204 and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and Explosives prohibits individuals who use federally 
“controlled substances” from possessing firearms.205  In his article, 
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Professor Mikos observes, additionally, that marijuana dispensaries 
also can be held liable under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization statute, creating a civil cause of action against 
racketeers and authorizing enforcement by private persons injured by 
the racketeering activity.206 
 Even moving beyond the realm of strict sanctions, a lack of 
federal banking services available to medical marijuana dispensaries 
due their federal prohibition, even in states in which their operation 
is legal, serves to disadvantage both medical and non-medical 
marijuana businesses.207  In February, 2014, the federal government 
issued “guidance” on this issue, which was perceived by many 
banking institutions to be a “red light.”208  For example, the 
Colorado Bankers Association’s senior vice president, Jenifer 
Waller, acknowledged that the federal government outlined “all the 
risks involved of banking the marijuana industry,” and that, through 
this so-called “guidance,” the federal government has “made it very 
clear that financial institutions can still face criminal liability” for 
becoming involved with marijuana-related businesses, even if they 
are legal under state law.209 
 
C. What Happens to Medical Marijuana in 2017? 
 
 Notwithstanding the, at best, questionable authoritative 
weight of the Ogden Memo,210 the Obama administration is still the 
most medical-marijuana-friendly administration since the beginning 
of the “Drug War.”211  Specifically, no other president has ever 
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publicly discussed relaxing the Executive Branch’s policy toward 
medical marijuana during his campaign, and no other 
administration’s justice department has ever released a policy memo 
discouraging its AUSAs from enforcing federal marijuana law.212  
Although reliance on the Ogden Memo cannot be a defense to 
criminal charges,213 and the Memo does not really constrain the 
prosecutorial discretion of individual AUSAs,214 the Memo probably 
has influenced at least some individual AUSAs to scale back their 
prosecutions in this category.215  Moreover, as states such as 
Washington and Colorado have moved to legalize recreational 
marijuana, the DOJ has stated that it will be taking a “trust but 
verify” approach to these new state laws, purporting to require that 
the state regulatory systems in place must “not only contain robust 
controls and procedures on paper,” but must also “be effective in 
practice.”216  Accordingly, the DOJ apparently reserves the right to 
file a preemption lawsuit at a later date.217 
 But even if, beginning tomorrow, every AUSA ceased to 
prosecute medical marijuana crimes and every DEA agent ceased to 
raid marijuana facilities in states in which it is legal, what would that 
mean for the future?  One thing we can be certain of is that the 
Obama administration will not continue past year 2016.  So what 
would happen if, rather than upcoming administrations continuing 
this more liberal trend towards medical marijuana policy, the Obama 
DOJ’s policy in this area actually proves to be the most liberal of the 
21st century?218  Even Bill Clinton, in his recent democratic and 
relatively liberal administration, took a hard stance toward medical 
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marijuana.219  Similarly, every earlier administration since the start 
of the “War on Drugs” has adopted a relatively stern policy toward 
marijuana, both medical and recreational.220 
 Pursuant to federal law, subsequent U.S. administrations 
would be well within their constitutional rights to take an extremely 
aggressive stance toward medical marijuana, due to the fact that it is, 
technically, illegal,221 and because the [federal] “Laws of the United 
States” are the “supreme law of the land.”222  There is even a strong 
argument that, assuming this federal law is not changed,223 
subsequent administrations would be constitutionally obligated to 
enforce it.224  As noted earlier in this article, the marijuana industry 
has been growing at a rate of 13.8 percent since 2009,225 and, during 
the next five years, as Wells Fargo Managing Director Steve Berg 
predicts, it will likely grow to $10.2 billion annually.226  Currently, 
an estimated 1.3 million people are employed in the industry 
nationwide,227 and that number, too, is likely to grow as 14 more 
states are expected to legalize some form of marijuana by 2018.228 
 Given these current realities, if future administrations’ 
medical marijuana policies diverge in a conservative direction from 
those of President Obama, the results could be catastrophic for the 
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economies of states with booming medical marijuana industries, as 
well as for the individuals employed therein.229  Since the formation 
of the DEA, there have been eight presidential administrations.230  
Seven of them have aggressively prosecuted marijuana-related 
crimes, both medical and otherwise.231  Only one of them has 
released a memorandum discouraging one category of federal 
medical marijuana prosecutions,232 and yet, as I have shown, this 
memorandum does not truly constrain prosecutorial discretion,233 
nor can its existence serve as a legal defense.234  Meanwhile, even 
during the most liberal of the past eight administrations (that of 
President Obama), the DEA continues to raid medical marijuana 
dispensaries,235 and there is at least some evidence of the DOJ 
continuing to prosecute them.236   
 For these reasons, and based on the evidence I have 
presented, I would advise state legislatures to be cautious when 
deciding whether to legalize medical marijuana, and I would advise 
individuals to be similarly cautious when relying on their home 
states’ recently changed laws as a reason to get involved in the 
marijuana industry.237  Despite predictions of large growth based on 
current trends under this administration, there truly is no knowing, or 
even projecting, at this point in time, how long these trends will last. 
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D. The Policy Disseminated in the Ogden Memo Constitutes, at 
Best, a Constitutionally Questionable Use of the Executive Branch’s 
Broad Prosecutorial Discretion Power 
 
 The United States Constitution mandates that Congress has 
the power both to regulate interstate commerce as well as to make all 
laws that are necessary and proper for the execution of its own 
powers, and that these laws are the supreme laws of the land (as 
compared to the laws of the states).238  In a very real sense, Congress 
relied on these powers when it enacted the CSA in 1970, which 
criminalized the possession, cultivation, and use of marijuana under 
federal law.239  And, as previously discussed, the Supreme Court has 
affirmed that this criminalization of marijuana-related activities was 
within Congress’s constitutional powers, thereby leaving no doubt 
that Congress had the ability to enact these laws, and that they had 
binding authority on the states.240  Moreover, the Constitution also 
requires the Executive Branch to execute the laws of the United 
States.241  Therefore, given the facts that (1) the Legislative Branch 
not only passed the CSA within its legitimate constitutional power, 
but has also consistently resisted efforts for marijuana-related 
reform;242 (2) the Judicial Branch affirmed that criminalization of 
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marijuana was within Congress’s power;243 and (3) the Executive 
Branch is expressly required to execute Congress’s laws,244 it seems 
somewhat surprising that the Executive Branch’s DOJ even has the 
power to release a memorandum—the Ogden Memo—announcing a 
policy non-enforcement of a certain crime upon a certain class of 
defendants who are found to be in violation federal law. 
 On the other hand, the Executive Branch does possess one 
power that remains relatively unchecked by Congress or by the 
Judiciary—the power of prosecutorial discretion.  Under federal law, 
prosecutors have exclusive discretion over the decision to prosecute, 
assuming the crime in question is supported by probable cause.245  
Additionally, the prosecutor also has discretion in deciding how he 
will conduct that prosecution.246  Specifically, the prosecutor may 
choose which crime, if any, to charge the defendant with;247 when to 
grant immunity;248 whether to accept a plea bargain;249 and whether 
to dismiss charges.250  Following these types of decisions, “no court 
has any jurisdiction to inquire into or review a prosecutor's decision 
to treat differently two persons who may have committed what is 
precisely the same legal offense.”251 
                                                                                                                
1144, 109th Cong. (2006); H. Amdt. 272, 109th Cong. (2005); H. Amdt. 646, 
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243 See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005). 
244 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”). 
245 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“[S]o long as the 
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense 
defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to 
file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”). 
246 See Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: 
Origins and Development, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 8 (2009) [hereinafter 
Krauss]. 
247 United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979) (“[W]hen an act 
violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecutes (sic) 
under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants.”). 
248 United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78, 87 (1st Cir. 2000) (“A United States 
Attorney's authority to grant use immunity is implied from her statutory authority 
to make decisions anent prosecution . . . .”). 
249 Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1967).  
250 FED. R. CRIM. P. r. 48(a) (“The government may, with leave of court, dismiss 
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  In the 1979 case United States v. Batchelder, the Supreme 
Court explained that, while the Executive Branch has broad 
prosecutorial discretion, “selectivity in the enforcement of criminal 
laws is [still] subject to constitutional constraints.”252  However, 
despite these alleged constraints, this discretion is left largely 
unchecked by the Judicial Branch.253  As the Supreme Court 
explained in Wayte v. United States, 
 
This broad discretion rests largely on the 
recognition that the decision to prosecute is 
particularly ill-suited to judicial review.  Such 
factors as the strength of the case, the 
prosecution’s general deterrence value, the 
Government’s enforcement priorities, and the 
case’s relationship to the Government’s 
overall enforcement plan are not readily 
susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts 
are competent to undertake.254 
 
 Indeed, the Judicial Branch seems to be in agreement that 
“the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict . . 
. has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive 
Branch,”255 and therefore that limiting that discretion by imposing 
judicial review “would invade the traditional separation of 
powers doctrine.”256  Logic dictates, however, that with unchecked 
power comes potential for abuse.257  As Kenneth Culp Davis 
                                                 
252 442 U.S. 114, 115 (1979) (emphasis added). 
253 Note, however, that the charging decision may be limited when an individual’s 
constitutional rights are in question, in the context of “vindictive” and “selective” 
prosecutions.  See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 605, 608 (1985) (finding 
selective prosecution claims to be judged according to ordinary equal protection 
standards); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (finding a due 
process violation in “vindictive” prosecution that had been brought in retaliation 
for defendant's exercise of her legal rights). 
254 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). 
255 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). 
256 See Krauss, supra note 246, at 10 (citing U. S. v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & 
Neckwear Contractors Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 483, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)). 












observes in his book Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 
“[i]n our entire system of law and government, the greatest 
concentrations of unnecessary discretionary power over individual 
parties are not in the regulatory agencies but are in police and 
prosecutors.”258  
 Ironically, the constitutional clause requiring the President to 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”259 is the clause 
most-often cited to support the contention that federal prosecutors 
should possess virtually unchecked discretion, pursuant to the 
Constitution.260  In recent decades, however, there has been 
considerable debate concerning whether the power to prosecute 
should be solely within the province of the Executive Branch; 
although almost all of the discussion has pertained to questions of 
whether a President should be able to control decisions to prosecute 
individuals within his own branch.261  For example, following the 
Watergate scandal, one Senator “rejected the idea that the 
administration of justice is inherently executive, observing that there 
is not one syllable in the Constitution that says that Congress cannot 
make the DOJ independent of the President.”262 
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(Greenwood Press ed. 1980). 
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260 See Krauss, supra note 246, at 23 (citing William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy 
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261 See, e.g., Gwyn, supra note 260, at 484–85.  
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to establish the Justice Department as an independent agency . . . .  Lloyd N. 
Cutler agreed [with Senator Ervin] and noted that to interpret the faithful 
execution clause as requiring that all federal prosecutors serve at the President's 
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President, the Attorney General and their immediate assistants that we cannot and 
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rather such power resides both in the Executive and Judiciary.  Similarly, Arthur 
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prosecutorial function to require that it be an executive function.” (quotations 
omitted) (citing Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the 












 There has been relatively little debate, however, that has 
focused on how the Executive Branch’s power to prosecute might, or 
should, be checked in the context of a grand, policy-based decision 
not to prosecute a certain kind of crime or a certain class of criminal, 
especially when Congress has decisively indicated its legitimate 
desire to make the category of behavior in question illegal.263  In 
Ponzi v. Fessenden, the Supreme Court described the Attorney 
General as “the hand of the President in taking care that the laws of 
the United States[,] in protection of the interests of the United States 
in legal proceedings and in the prosecution of offences [sic], be 
faithfully executed.”264  While the Court’s language certainly 
indicates that the prosecutorial function lies inherently within the 
Executive Branch, both the Ponzi opinion, as well as the wording of 
[what is generally referred to as] the “Take Care” clause of the 
Constitution (the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed”), seem to additionally suggest that the President is 
obligated to faithfully execute all United States laws.265  
 Given that Congress is tasked with law-making, and that the 
Executive Branch is tasked with enforcing the laws made by 
Congress, it is difficult to see from where the authority for the type 
of expansive prosecutorial discretion encouraged by the Ogden 
Memo is derived from.266  A blanket Executive Branch policy, such 
as that described in the Ogden Memo, which has the intended 
purpose and/or effect of undermining the clout of one of these very 
laws of the United States, would certainly seem to fly in the face of 
                                                 
263 See H.R. 5842, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. 2087, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 
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266 See Krauss, supra note 246, at 2 (arguing that “[t]he constitutional separation of 
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a more narrow sense (non-impermissible differing prosecutorial decisions between 
seemingly similarly situated defendants, for example); whereas I am specifically 
arguing that policy-based prosecutorial discretion on the scale of the Ogden Memo 
is of questionable constitutional validity pursuant to the Constitutional obligations 












the plain-text meaning of the “Take Care” clause of the 
Constitution.267 
 In his comment, Highly Uncertain Times: An Analysis of the 
Executive Branch’s Decision to not Investigate or Prosecute 
Individuals in Compliance with State Medical Marijuana Laws, 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission staff attorney 
Vijay Sekhon argues that the Executive Branch’s obligation to 
faithfully prosecute Congress’s laws constitutes the very 
“constitutional constraints” on prosecutorial discretion that the 
Supreme Court referred to in Batchelder.268  Sekhon also asserts that 
the Supreme Court’s rationale supporting its refusal to “check” the 
Executive Branch’s prosecutorial discretion, articulated in Wayte,269 
would not be frustrated by judicial review of the policy put forth by 
the Ogden Memo.270  Specifically, Sekhon argues that such a judicial 
review of the decision not to prosecute individuals in compliance 
with state medical marijuana laws would not undermine 
prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Executive Branch’s 
enforcement policy, nor would it delay any enforcement proceeding 
or chill law enforcement efforts, because the Executive Branch has 
already publicly announced its enforcement policy in this area.271  
Furthermore, Mr. Sekhon maintains, the concerns of the Court 
                                                 
267 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Sekhon, supra note 30, at 558 (“If 
presented with the question regarding the constitutionality of the Executive 
Branch's decision to not investigate or prosecute individuals in compliance with 
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regarding judicial review of the strengths of a particular case, as well 
as a particular case’s relationship to the Executive Branch’s 
enforcement plan and/or the general deterrence value of the 
prosecution of a particular case, would also not be applicable in this 
context.272  Rather, the review would relate to the Executive 
Branch’s general enforcement plan in this area, as opposed to the 
prosecution of a particular case.273  Ultimately, I am in agreement 
with Mr. Sekhon that the policy put forth in the Ogden Memo 
constitutes “a questionable use of prosecutorial discretion.”274 
 In addition to consistently holding that it lacks the ability to 
check the Executive Branch’s prosecutorial discretion,275 the 
Supreme Court also has repeatedly determined that victims and 
interested citizens lack the ability to check the Executive Branch’s 
use of prosecutorial discretion when their personal constitutional 
rights have not been directly violated.276  In Linda R.S. v. Richard 
D., the Supreme Court held that “a citizen lacks standing to contest 
the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither 
prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.”277  The Supreme Court 
has, similarly, established a doctrine of sovereign immunity, which 
prohibits lawsuits against the federal government in the vast majority 
of circumstances.278  As a result of this immunity, private citizens 
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273 Id. 
274 See id. 
275 See, e.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979). 
276 See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); Simon v. E. Ky. 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (stating it is “settled doctrine” that 
“the exercise of prosecutorial discretion cannot be challenged by one who is 
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277 Richard D., 410 U.S. at 619.  Note that a criminal defendant, by contrast, is 
afforded some limited degree of recourse in the context of allegations that the 
government has made their decisions to prosecute on the basis of unconstitutional 
considerations.  See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (stating vindictive 
prosecutions can violate of the Due Process Clause); Wayte, 470 U.S. at 605, 608 
(stating selective prosecution can violate of the Equal Protection clause). 
278 See Lee, 106 U.S. at 206–07.  Congress has, however, consented to lawsuits 
against the Federal Government in a limited category of circumstances. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006). Specifically through the Federal Tort Claims Act of 
1948, Congress has consented to lawsuits against the Government in 
“circumstances where the United States, if a Private person, would be liable to the 












would not be able to attain the requisite standing to sue the 
Executive Branch for its failure to enforce a provision of the 
Controlled Substances Act.279  It is worth noting, however, that 
when a defendant is able to demonstrate that a Constitutionally 
impermissible criterion played a significant role in the decision to 
prosecute,280 defendants may have standing to “check” specific 
instances of prosecutorial discretion,281 although they are rarely 
successful.282   
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has indicated that 
members of Congress might have standing to sue the Executive 
Branch for failure to enforce state medical marijuana laws.283  In its 
1939 decision Coleman v. Miller, the Court held that state senators 
had standing to challenge the passage of an amendment, pursuant to 
Article V of the Constitution, because senators “have a plain, direct 
and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes” 
                                                                                                                
occurred.”  Id.  In his comment, Vijay Sekhon explains that, because a private 
person cannot be liable for failure to enforce law, this statute would not permit a 
lawsuit by a private citizen against the Executive Branch for failure to enforce the 
Controlled Substances Act with respect to individuals in compliance with state 
medical marijuana laws.  See Sekhon, supra note 29, at 560.  Note also, as 
discussed earlier, that at least one Federal Court has expressly disallowed any sort 
of defense on the basis of reliance on the publicized non-prosecution policy, at 
least in the criminal context.  See Stacy, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.  Based on this 
decision, it is unlikely that any sort of reliance argument would be successful in 
the civil context, either.  See id.  
279 See Lee, 106 U.S. at 206–07; Sekhon, supra note 29, at 559. 
280 Of course, prosecutions, more generally are subject to many constitutional 
constraints.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
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searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No 
person shall…be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). Here, 
however, I am discussing the charging decision, itself.  
281 See, e.g., Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363; Wayte 470 U.S. at 605, 608. 
282 See Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct And Constitutional Remedies, 
77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 753 (1999). 












with respect to amendments to the federal Constitution.284  More 
recently, the Supreme Court has held that members of Congress did 
not have standing to challenge the Line Item Veto Act285 (giving the 
President the power to cancel items in any bill) in Raines v. Byrd 
because the members did not allege that they had been individually 
or concretely harmed by the Act; they had not voted for a bill that 
was affected by the Act; Congress's power to enact or repeal bills 
was not affected; and because Congress approved the Act and was 
also able to repeal it if it desired to do so.286 
Mr. Sekhon argues that, under this doctrine of legislative 
standing, any United States Senator or Representative who has voted 
for appropriations bills that appropriated funds to the DEA and the 
DOJ for enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act is likely to 
obtain standing if he or she were to challenge the Executive 
Branch’s decision not to prosecute individuals in compliance with 
state medical marijuana laws.287  To support his argument, Sekhon 
uses the Coleman rationale, specifically asserting that Congressional 
legislators would be able to demonstrate that the effectiveness of 
their votes on such appropriations bills has been nullified by the 
Executive Branch’s decision to disseminate enforcement policy that 
is in direct contravention to such bills.288  Further, Sekhon then 
distinguishes this hypothetical situation from the facts of Raines 
because, here, federal legislators could point directly to the specific 
appropriations bills that they voted for and that were passed, but 
were then nonetheless nullified by the change in the Executive 
Branch’s enforcement policy regarding medical marijuana.289 
While Mr. Sekhon may be correct with respect to the 
standing issue, I am not optimistic about a hypothetical Congress 
member’s chances of success in effectively challenging the 
legitimacy of the Ogden Memo, in light of the ample jurisprudence 
indicating the Judiciary’s strong reluctance to make any decisions 
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that might check the Executive Branch’s prosecutorial discretion.290  
On the other hand, as noted earlier, the Court has certainly shown a 
willingness to impose restraints on the Executive Branch’s 
prosecutorial discretion when it feels that certain constitutional 
provisions have been violated.291  Therefore, the Court’s decision in 
this matter would likely turn on whether the “Take Care” clause of 
the Constitution limits the Executive Branch’s prosecutorial 
discretion in a way that would restrict the branch from declaring a 
blanket refusal to prosecute an entire class of violations under 
federal law.292 
Regardless of its outcome, I do not think that anyone would 
disagree that such a proceeding would, if brought, cause harm to the 
perceived legitimacy of our federal government.  Given the ample 
and decisive evidence of Congress’s position that medical marijuana 
should remain illegal under federal law,293 it is certainly not out of 
the realm of possibility to imagine a legislator bringing this type of 
suit.  That being said, the current trend in state-by-state legalization 
of both medical and recreational purposes,294 together with the 
increasing public support for legalization, might serve as an effective 
political deterrent to any legislator’s potential action to bring this 
type of suit. 
Moving further into the purely hypothetical, if the Legislative 
Branch, as well as United States Citizens, are unable to trust the 
Executive Branch to enforce United States laws, what does this 
mean for the future of our separation of powers and the resulting 
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2233, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2592, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1344, 107th 
Cong. (2001); H.R. 912, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1782, 105th Cong. (1997); see 
also H. Amdt. 674, 110th Cong. (2007); H. Amdt. 1144, 109th Cong. (2006); H. 
Amdt. 272,109th Cong. (2005); H. Amdt. 646, 109th Cong. (2004); H. Amdt. 297, 
108th Cong. (2003). 
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obligations of the three branches?295  Or even for the continuing 
vitality of our Constitution itself?  Perhaps the Obama 
administration’s policy of non-enforcement of medical marijuana 
law is not catastrophic for this nation, in a practical sense, due to the 
growing popularity of medical marijuana use and the consequent 
burgeoning of the industry as noted.296  
Nevertheless, is there not a worry that the Ogden Memo, by 
its nature, will set a precedent demonstrating that the prosecutorial 
discretion of the Executive Branch can extend even to entire 
categories of federally illegal activity?297  What happens the next 
time that a Presidential administration disapproves of a criminal law 
that requires enforcement to remain legitimate?298  In this situation, 
without any enforcement, does the law cease to be a law at all?299  
Of course, the Executive Branch has veto power over bills before 
they can become law.300  However, if this type of policy of non-
enforcement were to continue to be even tacitly sanctioned and, 
indeed, become the norm, I believe that any incoming administration 
would have the ability to effectively nullify any standing criminal 
law, which had been previously passed by Congress and signed by a 
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Both as concept and as a reality, the Ogden Memo is bad 
policy.  As I have demonstrated in this article, the memo has the 
potential to lull states and those in the medical marijuana industry 
into a false sense of security regarding their chances of being 
prosecuted, both because it is unable to truly constrain the activities 
of DOJ personnel, and because it is utterly unclear if subsequent 
administrations will discourage enforcement in a similar fashion.  
Further, the very notion of an administration promulgating a policy 
of non-enforcement over an entire class of criminal behavior is, at 
best, a questionable use of prosecutorial discretion. At worst, if this 
broad prosecutorial authority is left unchecked, it could set the 
precedent of providing future Presidential administrations with 
ultimate retrospective veto power over any or all federal criminal 
laws. 
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